Read the findings of the 2022 Web3 Security Report

The contract has unlocked compiler version. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to differing compiler version numbers. This can lead to ambiguity when debugging as compiler-specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.

Unlocked Compiler Version

In the contract LERC20.sol, the role `recoveryAdmin` has authority over the following functions:
- `transferRecoveryAdminOwnership()`: transfer the `recoveryAdmin` role to another address;
- `proposeLosslessTurnOff()`: set proposal of turning off the "lossless" mechanism;
- `executeLosslessTurnOff()`: execute the proposal of turning off the "lossless" mechanism;
- `executeLosslessTurnOn()`: turn on the "lossless" mechanism.

In the contract MUNDO.sol, the role `_owner` has authority over the following functions:
- `updateStakingPool()`: update the pool address that will receive fees;
- `updateTreasury()`: update the treasury address that will receive treasury fees;
- `addFreeOfChargeAddress()`: exclude an arbitrary address from fee;
- `deleteFreeOfChargeAddress()`: include an arbitrary address from fee;
- `enableFee()`: enable charging of fee during transfer;
- `updateFee()`: update fee configurations;
- `addAllowedContract()`: add an address to "allowed contract" list;
- `removeAllowedContract()`: remove an address from "allowed contract" list;
- `sendBack()`: send tokens within the contract to the owner.

In the contract TokenTimeLock.sol, the role `_owner` has authority over the following functions:
- `lockLPToken()`: lock the LP tokens;
- `continueLock()`: continue to lock LP tokens;
- `withdrawLocked()`: withdraw locked LP tokens after locking period;
- `addPool()`: add deposit pools;
- `bulkUploadDeposits()`: deposit in batch;
- `deposit()`: deposit tokens for a beneficiary.

Any compromise to the aforementioned privileged accounts may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and manipulate the protocol.

Centralization Related Risks

When deploying the contract, all of the `LERC20` tokens are sent to the contract deployer. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute `LERC20` tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.

Initial Token Distribution

The contract is serving as the underlying entity to interact with the third-party `lossless`(`ILosslessController`) protocol. The scope of the audit treats 3rd party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, 3rd parties can be compromised, which may lead to lost or stolen assets. If `isLosslessOn` is `true`, the `transfer()` / `approve()` / `transferFrom()` / `increaseAllowance()` / `decreaseAllowance()` function will trigger `lossless`'s corresponding invocation. The concern is if the `ILosslessController` is compromised, it could lead to unexpected behavior of the aforementioned functions.

Third Party Dependencies

The `admin` address declared in L55 performs no actual role in the current implementation. It is used in the function `getAdmin()` and `setLosslessAdmin()`, which only serves as a getter function. 

Unused `admin` Logic

There is no explicit validation to ensure the input is valid. For `_setStakingPool()` and `_setTreasury()` functions, there is no validation to ensure the input address is not `address(0)`. If the `_pool`/`_treasury` address is set as Zero, it could cause denial of service of transferral functionality.

Lack of Input Validation

The **require** can be used to check for conditions and throw an exception if the condition is not met. It is better to provide a string message containing details about the error that will be passed back to the caller. For example,
```solidity=94
                require(super.transfer(_treasury, treasuryAmount));
            }
            require(super.transfer(recipient, sendingAmount));
            require(super.transfer(_pool, feeAmount));
```

Missing Error Messages

The implementation of the `isContract` check can not cover all scenarios. The check can be bypassed if the call is from the `constructor` of a smart contract or when the contract is destroyed. Because, in that case, the `codesize` will also be zero.
```solidity=29
        uint256 size;
        assembly {
            size := extcodesize(account)
        }
        return size > 0;
```

The "isContract()" function in the OpenZeppelin "Address" library uses the same implementation, but comments mention that "it's unsafe to rely on the check and it can be bypassed". Reference: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/master/contracts/utils/Address.sol 


Ineffective `isContract()` Check

When transferring standard ERC20 deflationary tokens, the input amount may not be equal to the received amount due to the charged transaction fee. For example, if a user deposits 100 deflationary tokens (with a 10% transaction fee) in the timelock contract, only 90 tokens actually arrived in the contract. However, the user can still withdraw 100 tokens from the contract, which causes the contract to lose 10 tokens in such a transaction. 


Incompatibility With Deflationary Tokens

A reentrancy attack can occur when the contract creates a function that makes an external call to another untrusted contract before resolving any effects. 
If the attacker can control the untrusted contract, they can make a recursive call back to the original function, repeating interactions that would have otherwise not run after the external call resolved the effects. 

In the `withdraw()` function, `poolLockTime[_poolName].withdrawn` is updated after external call to `token.transfer(_msgSender(), amount)`. Considering the `token` implementation is unknown, check-effect-interaction pattern is recommended for reducing the attack vector.
```solidity=159
        require(
            token.transfer(_msgSender(), amount),
            "Cannot send to beneficiary"
        );
        poolLockTime[_poolName].withdrawn = poolLockTime[_poolName]
        .withdrawn
        .add(amount);
```

Check-effect-interaction Pattern Violation

Mundo

SafeMath.sol

TokenTimelock.sol

Ownable.sol

ERC20.sol

Context.sol

LERC20.sol

Timelock

MUNDO

IERC20.sol

MUNDO.sol

Address.sol

Mundo 

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Code Audit History

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