Read the findings of the 2022 Web3 Security Report

The `RetroDoge` Protocol is a decentralized finance(Defi) token deployed on the BSC. 

Most transactions will be charged fees including burnFee/stakeFee/marketingFee/liquidityFee. If at least one of sender and recipient is exclude from fee, the fees will be removed. The buy fee and sell fee can be set differently. The wallet transfer transaction is free. If the contract is in `launchMode`, every sell transaction will be charged `launchModeFees`. All the fee rates can be changed by owner at any time.
- initial totalBuyFees: 7%
- initial totalSellFees: 11%
- initial launchModeFees: 30%

The burnFee is burnt to dead wallet. The stakeFee is for `_stakingWalletAddress` in form of `RTDOGE` token. The marketingFee is for `_marketingWalletAddress` after converted to `MARKETING_TOKEN`. The liquidityFee is used to add liquidity. The LP token is for contract address, but the owner can withdraw it.

Finance Model

In the contract `RetroDoge` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.
Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority.
![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/909209b011634ae4ac568bc932121e02/diagrams/centralization_RetroDoge__owner.svg)

Centralization Risks in RetroDoge.sol

All of the `RTDOGE` tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute RTDOGE tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.

Initial Token Distribution

The `addLiquidity()` function calls the `uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH()` function with the `to` address specified as `address(this)` for acquiring the generated LP tokens from the `RTDOGE-WBNB` pool. As a result, over time the contract address will accumulate a significant portion of LP tokens.

However, the owner can withdraw all the LP tokens by function `recoverToken()`.  If the `_owner` is an EOA (Externally Owned Account), mishandling of its private key can have devastating consequences to the project as a whole.

Centralized Risk in `addLiquidity`

The owner is able to call function `flipTransfers()` to pause all the transfer transactions.

Owner Can Pause Transfer

The `launchMode` can not be turned off because the `launchMode != launchMode` does not really switch the `launchMode`. This makes the `totalSellFees` useless.

Update `launchMode` Mistakenly 

Addresses should be checked before assignment or external call to make sure they are not zero addresses.

File: contracts/RetroDoge.sol (Line 111, Function `RetroDoge.updateUniswapV2Pair`)
```solidity
        uniswapV2Pair = newAddress;
```
- `newAddress` is not zero-checked before being used.


---
File: contracts/RetroDoge.sol (Line 115, Function `RetroDoge.setMarketingWallet`)
```solidity
        _marketingWalletAddress = wallet;
```
- `wallet` is not zero-checked before being used.


---
File: contracts/RetroDoge.sol (Line 119, Function `RetroDoge.setStakingWallet`)
```solidity
        _stakingWalletAddress = wallet;
```
- `wallet` is not zero-checked before being used.


---
File: contracts/RetroDoge.sol (Line 381, Function `RetroDoge.recoverBNB`)
```solidity
        to.transfer(amount);
```
- `to` is not zero-checked before being used.


---
File: contracts/RetroDoge.sol (Line 385, Function `RetroDoge.setMarketingToken`)
```solidity
        MARKETING_TOKEN = newToken;
```
- `newToken` is not zero-checked before being used.



Missing Zero Address Validation

It is not enough only to set the restriction that each fee can not be over 25%. If each fee value is set as `2499`, it will make the total fee almost close to 100%.

Insufficient Tax Restriction

A sandwich attack might happen when an attacker observes a transaction swapping tokens or adding liquidity without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount. The attacker can manipulate the exchange rate by frontrunning (before the transaction being attacked) a transaction to purchase one of the assets and make profits by backrunning (after the transaction being attacked) a transaction to sell the asset.

The following functions are called without setting restrictions on slippage or minimum output amount, so transactions triggering these functions are vulnerable to sandwich attacks, especially when the input amount is large:

- `swapTokensForEth()`
- `swapTokensForTokens()`
- `addLiquidity()`

Potential Sandwich Attacks

There should always be events emitted in the sensitive functions that are controlled by centralization roles.

Missing Emit Events

State variables that never change should be declared as `constant` to save gas.

State Variable Should Be Declared Constant

The linked events are declared but never used.

Unused Event

After router and pair is updated in function `updateUniswapV2Router()` and `updateUniswapV2Pair()`, the function `_setAutomatedMarketMakerPair()` is not called to update the related states.

After wallet address is updated in function `setMarketingWallet()` and `setStakingWallet()`, the function `excludedFromPausedTransfersAndFees` is not called to update the related states.

RetroDoge

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Code Audit History

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