Read the findings of the 2022 Web3 Security Report

Addresses should be checked before assignment or external call to make sure they are not zero addresses.

File: projects/contracts/VaultFactory.sol (Line 48, Function `VaultFactory.constructor`)
```solidity
        wavax = _wavax;
```
- `_wavax` is not zero-checked before being used.


---
File: projects/contracts/VaultFactory.sol (Line 49, Function `VaultFactory.constructor`)
```solidity
        sgx = _sgx;
```
- `_sgx` is not zero-checked before being used.


---
File: projects/contracts/VaultFactory.sol (Line 50, Function `VaultFactory.constructor`)
```solidity
        gSGX = _gSGX;
```
- `_gSGX` is not zero-checked before being used.


---
File: projects/contracts/VaultFactory.sol (Line 51, Function `VaultFactory.constructor`)
```solidity
        treasury = _treasury;
```
- `_treasury` is not zero-checked before being used.


---
File: projects/contracts/VaultFactory.sol (Line 52, Function `VaultFactory.constructor`)
```solidity
        research = _research;
```
- `_research` is not zero-checked before being used.


---
File: projects/contracts/VaultFactory.sol (Line 53, Function `VaultFactory.constructor`)
```solidity
        lockup = _lockup;
```
- `_lockup` is not zero-checked before being used.


---
File: projects/contracts/lockupHell.sol (Line 120, Function `LockupHell.constructor`)
```solidity
        sgx = sgxAddress;
```
- `sgxAddress` is not zero-checked before being used.


---
File: projects/contracts/lockupHell.sol (Line 337, Function `LockupHell.setVaultFactory`)
```solidity
        vaultFactory = vaultAddress;
```
- `vaultAddress` is not zero-checked before being used.



Missing Zero Address Validation

The contract has unlocked compiler version. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to differing compiler version numbers. This can lead to an ambiguity when debugging as compiler specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.

Unlocked Compiler Version

In the contract `VaultFactory` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.

Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and implement two attacks that would lead to the projects demise. 

*Denote Oscar as the hacker*

*1st Attack* 

Many `SGX` tokens can be created. Oscar will minimize the time to wait to receive staking rewards by calling `setRewardsWaitTime()`. Then he will call the function `setNetworkBoost` and set the boost to 1000% so that when he stakes his tokens, a larger amount of tokens will be saved in his vault. Finally, Oscar will minimize the variables `burnPercent`, and maximize `liquidateVaultPercent` to maximize his profits. 


*2nd Attack* 

Oscar can pause the contract and then renounce ownership via the functions `setCircuitBreaker()` and `renounceOwnership()`. With this attack users cannot deposit liquidity into vaults nor create vaults. 




![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/42c51679570048b486a025019d29e4d5/diagrams/centralization-VaultFactory-_owner.svg)

Centralization Risk in VaultFactory.sol

In the contract `Subgenix` the role `_owner` has authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.

Any compromise to the `_owner` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this authority and set themself as a manager and mint as many tokens as they want. 

A compromised `_owner` account may pause the contract indefinitely by first pausing the contract via `pauseContract()` and then renouncing the contract. 

![](https://accelerator-tasks-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/42c51679570048b486a025019d29e4d5/diagrams/centralization-Subgenix-_owner.svg)

Centralization Risk in Subgenix.sol

In `ValultFactory.sol` users may stake their `SGX` for future rewards. When a user stakes tokens their vault is updated by adding `(stakedAmount * networkBoost)` to their total balance saved in the vault. If `networkBoost` is zero it will lead to a loss of funds. Therefore we should add a statement in `setNetworkBoost()` that requires `networkBoost > 0`.

Also, `networkBoost` is initialized to zero. The functions `createInVault()`, `createOwnerVault()` and `depositInVault()` handle updating a users balance. These functions should also contain a check that the `networkBoost` is not zero before users partake in staking. 

Missing `require` Statement

The comment on line 348 in `VaultFactory.sol` states that `SGX` should be deposited. However, on line 355, there is a possibility of allowing different tokens if `acceptedToken[token] = true`;.

Misleading Comments

When a user creates a vault a portion of their tokens are transferred to the treasury address. The transfer can be seen on line 342 in `VaultFactory.sol`. The confusion stems from the `approve` statement on line 340. The need for this approve statement is not clear. 

Unclear Use of `approve()`

Modifier VaultFactory.stopInEmergency() (VaultFactory.sol#64) does not revert

File: projects/contracts/VaultFactory.sol (Line 64, Contract `VaultFactory`)
```solidity
    modifier stopInEmergency { if (!stopped) _; }
```
Function calls where `stopInEmergency` is false do not revert.  

Modifier Does Not Revert Transactions

The return value of an external call is not stored in a local or state variable.

File: projects/contracts/VaultFactory.sol (Line 550, Function `VaultFactory.swapSGXforAVAX`)
```solidity
        joeRouter.swapExactTokensForAVAX(toTreasury, 0, path, treasury, block.timestamp);
```


---
File: projects/contracts/VaultFactory.sol (Line 551, Function `VaultFactory.swapSGXforAVAX`)
```solidity
        joeRouter.swapExactTokensForAVAX(toResearch, 0, path, research, block.timestamp);
```



Unused Return Value

The functions which are never called internally within the contract should have external visibility for gas optimization.

File: projects/contracts/VaultFactory.sol (Line 604, Contract `VaultFactory`)
```solidity
    function claimRewards(address user) public nonReentrant {
```



Function Should Be Declared External

Subgenix

interfaces

Isgx.sol

GovernanceSGX.sol

IgSGX.sol

IJoeRouter02.sol

lockupHell.sol

Subgenix.sol

IJoeRouter01.sol

VaultFactory.sol

ILockupHell.sol

contracts

Subgenix Network 

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Subgenix Network

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Code Audit History

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