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CertiK는 개발자와 사용자를 위해 Web3 보안, 블록체인 감사 및 규정 준수에 관한 블로그와 고객 사례 등 교육 콘텐츠를 제공합니다.
기술 인사이트Web2 Meets Web3: Hacking Decentralized ApplicationsThis blog offers insights into the differences between traditional Web2 applications and Web3 Dapps, Dapp threat modeling, and unique attack vectors enabled by the integration of blockchain components.
기술 인사이트Risk & Security Enhancement for App Chains: An In-depth Writeup of CWA-2023-004In January 2024, CertiK research team, in collaboration with Confio's security contributors, identified and addressed a high-impact vulnerability affecting App Chains that allow permissionless uploads in the CosmosWasm ecosystem. This vulnerability, designated as CWA-2023-004, enables a remote attacker to submit a malformed contract payload, causing a deterministic failure in every transaction processed by the WasmVM. This ultimately leads to a widespread outage across the validator network.
회사 소식CertiK Statement on Kraken VulnerabilityIn June, CertiK Skyfall team conducting whitehat research discovered a critical vulnerability in the Kraken platform. We notified the exchange to ensure this important vulnerability was fixed—which was a win for blockchain and Web3 security.
기술 인사이트How AI is Enhancing Web3: Innovations at the Crossroads of Decentralization Artificial intelligence (AI) and Web3 are two of the most transformative technologies shaping the future of digital interactions. The intersection of these technologies offers intriguing possibilities for enhancing privacy, security, and operational efficiency.
기술 인사이트Clarity: Best Practices and ChecklistsClarity is a smart contract language developed collaboratively by Hiro PBC, Algorand, and other stakeholders. It is currently utilized on the Stacks chain (Bitcoin sidechain). The primary goal of Clarity is to provide a high level of predictability and security, ensuring that smart contracts behave as intended without any unexpected side effects.In this article, we explore the concept behind Clarity smart contracts, as well as best practices and security checklists for programming with Clarity.
리서치 보고서Vow Incident AnalysisOn 12 August 2024, VOW token was exploited for around $1.2 million. The usdRateSetter address (0xbA1be907f532Ff6bb0088279e0f3DCDdD693aC7c) in the VOW contract temporarily changed the exchange rate (usdRate) between VOW and vUSD from 1 to 100. A malicious actor exploited the new usdRate to obtain vUSD at 100 times the correct amount.
기술 인사이트Bridge TracingIn this blog we look at how to trace cryptocurrency assets moving cross-chain on some of the most commonly used bridges.
리서치 보고서UtopiaSphere Incident AnalysisOn 21 July 2024, UtopiaSphere token UPS was exploited for ~$521K via a flash loan exploit. The exploiter used flash loaned funds in order to manipulate the token price of UPS by taking advantage of the project’s swapBurn() mechanism which burns a portion of UPS when selling. The UPS/USDT pair has remained empty and inactive since the exploit.
기술 인사이트Advanced Formal Verification of ZKP: How ZK Memory Was ProvenIn this post, we will discuss some interesting technical points that arise along our journey of verifying the zkWasm memory subsystem. The memory is the most distinctive part of a zkVM, so handling this well is a crucial point relevant for all other zkVM verification projects as well.
기술 인사이트Vanity Address and Address PoisoningVanity addresses are custom wallet addresses created using specific algorithms. These addresses can incorporate a chosen sequence of characters, making them more easily identifiable. Most often, when vanity addresses are mentioned, it refers to the Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains.
리서치 보고서Dough Finance Incident AnalysisOn 12 July 2024, Dough Finance was exploited for ~$2.1m via multiple flash loan transactions. The attacker exploited arbitrary call vulnerabilities in the Dough ConnectorDeleverageParaswap contracts which allowed them to transfer WETH directly from these vulnerable contracts.
리서치 보고서YOLO Games (Bazaar) 인시던트 분석On 10 June 2024, YOLO Games announced via their X account that a security vulnerability had been reported on the Bazaar LBP contract. As a consequence the YOLO LBP sale was ended early and users holding rYOLO would be refunded.