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CertiK 为开发者和用户提供 Web3 安全、区块链审计与合规相关的博客、客户案例等教育内容。
技术洞察Web2 Meets Web3: Hacking Decentralized ApplicationsThis blog offers insights into the differences between traditional Web2 applications and Web3 Dapps, Dapp threat modeling, and unique attack vectors enabled by the integration of blockchain components.
技术洞察Risk & Security Enhancement for App Chains: An In-depth Writeup of CWA-2023-004In January 2024, CertiK research team, in collaboration with Confio's security contributors, identified and addressed a high-impact vulnerability affecting App Chains that allow permissionless uploads in the CosmosWasm ecosystem. This vulnerability, designated as CWA-2023-004, enables a remote attacker to submit a malformed contract payload, causing a deterministic failure in every transaction processed by the WasmVM. This ultimately leads to a widespread outage across the validator network.
公司动态CertiK Statement on Kraken VulnerabilityIn June, CertiK Skyfall team conducting whitehat research discovered a critical vulnerability in the Kraken platform. We notified the exchange to ensure this important vulnerability was fixed—which was a win for blockchain and Web3 security.
技术洞察How AI is Enhancing Web3: Innovations at the Crossroads of Decentralization Artificial intelligence (AI) and Web3 are two of the most transformative technologies shaping the future of digital interactions. The intersection of these technologies offers intriguing possibilities for enhancing privacy, security, and operational efficiency.
技术洞察Clarity: Best Practices and ChecklistsClarity is a smart contract language developed collaboratively by Hiro PBC, Algorand, and other stakeholders. It is currently utilized on the Stacks chain (Bitcoin sidechain). The primary goal of Clarity is to provide a high level of predictability and security, ensuring that smart contracts behave as intended without any unexpected side effects.In this article, we explore the concept behind Clarity smart contracts, as well as best practices and security checklists for programming with Clarity.
研究报告Vow Incident AnalysisOn 12 August 2024, VOW token was exploited for around $1.2 million. The usdRateSetter address (0xbA1be907f532Ff6bb0088279e0f3DCDdD693aC7c) in the VOW contract temporarily changed the exchange rate (usdRate) between VOW and vUSD from 1 to 100. A malicious actor exploited the new usdRate to obtain vUSD at 100 times the correct amount.
技术洞察Bridge TracingIn this blog we look at how to trace cryptocurrency assets moving cross-chain on some of the most commonly used bridges.
研究报告UtopiaSphere Incident AnalysisOn 21 July 2024, UtopiaSphere token UPS was exploited for ~$521K via a flash loan exploit. The exploiter used flash loaned funds in order to manipulate the token price of UPS by taking advantage of the project’s swapBurn() mechanism which burns a portion of UPS when selling. The UPS/USDT pair has remained empty and inactive since the exploit.
技术洞察Advanced Formal Verification of ZKP: How ZK Memory Was ProvenIn this post, we will discuss some interesting technical points that arise along our journey of verifying the zkWasm memory subsystem. The memory is the most distinctive part of a zkVM, so handling this well is a crucial point relevant for all other zkVM verification projects as well.
技术洞察Vanity Address and Address PoisoningVanity addresses are custom wallet addresses created using specific algorithms. These addresses can incorporate a chosen sequence of characters, making them more easily identifiable. Most often, when vanity addresses are mentioned, it refers to the Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains.
研究报告Dough Finance Incident AnalysisOn 12 July 2024, Dough Finance was exploited for ~$2.1m via multiple flash loan transactions. The attacker exploited arbitrary call vulnerabilities in the Dough ConnectorDeleverageParaswap contracts which allowed them to transfer WETH directly from these vulnerable contracts.
研究报告YOLO Games(Bazaar)事件分析On 10 June 2024, YOLO Games announced via their X account that a security vulnerability had been reported on the Bazaar LBP contract. As a consequence the YOLO LBP sale was ended early and users holding rYOLO would be refunded.